thoughts of a fool

Art. 38, Civil Code. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Appellant killed his wife and daughter while wounding others with a bolo. Witnesses testify that he seemed insane during and after the commission of the crimes:

1. There was no known disagreement between the family members of the appellant prior to the event.
2. Appellant looked like a mad man; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying attention to who it was.
3. He was quiet during his time in prison and cried out every other night, “What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts.”

Confronted with the issue of whether or not the Vaquilar was mentally deranged during the commission of the crime, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

“There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Being crazy is a state wherein a person is merely acting out of the ordinary whereas being insane means acting with an unsound, perhaps diseased, mind. Not applying restraint to anger or passion makes the appellant criminally liable. The testimonies do not prove insanity, they merely point to hysteric acts.”

Further, in People v. Mortimer, the SC distinguished passion and insanity as follows:

“Passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to person under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility.”

In People v. Foy, the court said:

“The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity.”

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

In this case, Miguela Carrillo, as sister of deceased Adriana Carrillo and current administratrix of the latter’s estate, brought action to the CFI Cavite for the annulment of the document of because her sister was declared mentally incapacitated nine days after the transaction. She was confined in the hospital (and was there for the duration of the period) a month before the transaction occurred. The issue was whether or not Adriana was mentally incapacitated at the time the document of sale was executed.

The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced before the Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person.

Art. 43, Civil Code. If there is doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the others.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court. When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes according to the following rules…

In Joaquin v. Navarro, the pertinent facts are that the father, mother and son died during the liberation of Manila, 1946. They were both on a building which was on fire and which was being monitored by Japanese soldiers who would shoot those who tried to escape. The son, upon attempting the escape, was shot and killed. Minutes later, the building collapsed therefore killing both parents as well. The question of who died first was important in determining who would inherit. The Supreme Court held the argument that Sec. 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court repealed Art. 43 of the Civil Code was not relevant because neither of the provisions are applicable in the case at bar. Both provisions, as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be applied when there are facts. In this case, the son died first. The facts are adequate to solve the problem of survivorship without the need for statutory presumptions.